The Minority Game Unpacked: Coordination and Competition in a Team-based Experiment by Devetag, Giovanna et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Minority Game Unpacked: 
Coordination and Competition in a 
Team-based Experiment 
 
Giovanna Devetag 
Francesca Pancotto  
Thomas Brenner 
 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N° 770 
 
  
 
The Minority Game Unpacked: Coordination and
Competition in a Team-based Experiment*
Giovanna Devetag
Francesca Pancotto
Thomas Brenner
July 27, 2011
Abstract
In minority games, players in a group must decide at each round which of two
available options to choose, knowing that only subjects who picked the minority
option obtain a positive reward. Previous experiments on the minority and similar
congestion games have shown that players interacting repeatedly are remarkably able
to coordinate eﬃciently, despite not conforming to Nash equilibrium behavior. We
conduct an experiment on a Minority-of-three game in which each player is a team
composed by three subjects. Each team can freely discuss its strategies in the game
and decisions must be adopted through a majority rule. Team discussions are recorded
and their content analyzed to detect evidence of strategy co-evolution between teams
playing together. Our main results of group discussion analysis show no evidence
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supporting the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution, suggesting that individuals'
non conformity to Nash at the choice data level does not derive from imperfect ability
to randomize, but by players intentionally not pursuing this type of strategy. In
addition, teams that are more successful tend to be more self-centered over time,
paying more attention to their own past successful strategies than to the behavior
of other teams. Moreover, we ﬁnd evidence of mutual adaptation between players'
strategies, as teams that are more sophisticated (i.e., they pay more attention to
other teams' moves) tend, on average, to induce other teams to be less sophisticated
and more self-centered. Our results contribute to the understanding of coordination
dynamics resting on heterogeneity and co-evolution of decision rules rather than on
conformity to equilibrium behavior, both at the aggregate and at the individual level.
JEL codes: C72, C91, C92
Keywords: coordination, minority game, market eﬃciency, information, self-organization,
beliefs, cognitive learning
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1 Introduction
Congestion problems are at the core of many economic and social phenomena. A congestion
problem arises whenever one limited resource is overexploited by a population, while at the
same time other similar resources are underexploited due to a lack of coordination among
users. Route choice problems belong to this category: if two alternative routes can be used
to move from A to B, the average driving time will depend, among other things, on how
many drivers choose each of the two options; if there is lack of coordination, one road may
be congested and the other empty. Likewise, if a new market opportunity emerges, no
ﬁrm will be able to proﬁt from it if too many ﬁrms choose to enter the business. Common
to these examples is the fact that the payoﬀ accruing to each individual depends on the
choices of other individuals.
Congestion problems have recently received considerable attention from economists
and other social scientists, who have attempted to investigate them through the formal
apparatus of game theory, treating the coordination problem as an underlying problem of
selection of one out of many possible equilibria. Among the experimental studies are those
dealing with market entry games (Kahneman 1988), route choice games (Selten et al.,
2002), and minority games (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007).
The minority game (Challet and Zhang, 1997, 1998) is probably the most stylized and
barebone example of a congestion problem: in the game, a population of N agents (where N
is an odd number) must independently choose one of two possible actions or sides, say, A or
B. A positive and ﬁxed payoﬀ is assigned only to those agents who picked the minoritarian
side, while agents on the majority side earn nothing. The game is usually repeated for
several rounds, and the interesting question is whether or not a given population converges
to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium without the possibility to communicate or to make binding
agreements. The game is inspired by the well-known `El Farol' Bar problem formulated
originally by Arthur (1989), and it is a stylized representation of all those economic and
social situations in which there are advantages in belonging to the minority side. In the
absence of any element that may diﬀerentiate A from B, and lacking any intrinsic preference
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for either option, the actors face the non trivial task of trying to imagine what the majority
of other actors will choose, in order to choose the opposite. Coordination, and hence
aggregate eﬃciency, is achieved when players distribute themselves evenly among the two
available sides. The coordination problem is compounded by the fact that, unlike other
coordination games such as the stag hunt, all Nash equilibria in pure strategies are payoﬀ-
equivalent, leaving no obvious `salient' solution. Moreover, these equilibria are also non-
strict and payoﬀ-asymmetric, hence making them implausible stable outcomes in the long
run. Therefore, coordination in the minority game must necessarily rest on some dynamic
process of learning and co-evolution of strategies and behavioral rules by which players
learn to diﬀerentiate.
Experiments on minority games and similar congestion games have shown that groups
are generally remarkably good at achieving coordination, although individual behavior does
not conform to either the pure strategy or the mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Alternative
explanations of behavior that have been advanced take into account reinforcement learning
models (Erev and Roth, 1998), or a quantal response equilibrium (Goeree et al., 2005).
However, these explanation all imply that players randomize between the available options,
which is contradicted by the data. Moreover, the role of additional information available to
players seems inconsistent with all existing models of learning (Duﬀy and Hopkins, 2005).
Several experiments have pointed out that aggregate behavior in congestion games,
rather than through standard learning models or equilibrium notions, may better be ex-
plained through an `ecology' of heterogeneous rules of behavior: some of these are not
contingent on the game outcomes (e. g., choosing always the same option), while others
condition the choice in the current round on outcomes in previous rounds (Selten et al.,
2007; Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007). These behavioral rules, moreover, seem aﬀected to
some extent by the availability of information; a higher occurrence of `sorting' strate-
gies (i.e., rules prescribing to pick always the same side) and quicker convergence to pure
strategy equilibria have been observed when more information is available (Bottazzi and
Devetag, 2007; Duﬀy and Hopkins, 2005). Moreover, it has been shown that it is not only
heterogeneity of rules that determines aggregate eﬃciency, but, rather, their co-evolution
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over time, by which players modify their behavior in response to the game outcomes and
to the behavior of others (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007).
The evidence collected so far has suggested to redirect research on behavior in con-
gestion games to a systematic study of the diﬀerent response modes that players develop,
`to identify patterns of behavior shared by subsets of players...and then try to account
for aggregate behavior in terms of the behavior of the clusters of players that form these
aggregates' (Zwick and Rapoport (2002) also cited in Kets (2011)). Identifying clusters of
similar behaviors and their dynamic interaction may be realized ideally in the context of a
minority game, in which any response mode may be eﬀective, provided that it recommends
actions in opposition to the actions of opponents. Hence, it is only the interaction of rules
that counts for aggregate eﬃciency, not their rationality per se.
This paper presents a laboratory experiment that attempts to open the `black box' of the
minority game and of similar congestion games, by tracking down the main motivations
behind the adoption of behavioral rules and strategies, and hence help identifying the
most common patterns of behavior and their interaction. In order to do so, we design
and implement an experiment in which a minority game is played by teams of 3 players,
who are given the opportunity to freely discuss about the most appropriate course of
action throughout the game, and must decide on what to do in every round by applying
a unanimity or majority rule. The team discussions are videorecorded, and the discussion
content analyzed with the method of content analysis (Hennig-Schmidt, 1999).
Our interest is not in studing diﬀerences between individual and team behavior in the
minority game, but only in trying to infer the most common behavioral rules adopted in
the game and their main properties. Our use of teams instead of individual players, hence,
is only instrumental in capturing the main reasons behind the observed behavior through
the analysis of team discussion.
Hence, through content analysis we attempt to answer the following research questions:
are choices in the game mainly based on one's history of past payoﬀs, or on the behavior
of others? In the former case, how long is the history that is considered when choosing? If
the latter is the case, are players trying to inﬂuence the behavior of others or mainly react
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to it? How often are strategies such as `sorting', `randomization', `alternation', or others
suggested? Do these tend to be used more or less frequently depending on the behavior of
others during the course of the game?
In addition to our main research question, we also want to investigate the eﬀect of in-
formation, therefore we run two diﬀerent treatments: in the Partial information treatment,
teams are only informed about the `winning' side at the end of every round, whereas in the
Full information treatment, they are informed of each team's individual choice. We want to
test whether the availability of more information radically modiﬁes the main motivations
and strategic considerations at the basis of observed behavior. Our results can be used to
narrow down the set of possible response modes in congestion games, in order to better
describe aggregate behavior in these games as a function of a small set of features such as,
e.g., group size, availability of information about the choices of others, length of `history'
of past outcomes available, and so forth.
Our results show the relevance of the choice of the others in the discussions of the
teams as well as the history related to their own choices and past payoﬀs, diﬀerently for
the partial and full information treatments. Rarely subjects try to identify patterns or
general theories of the game that would allow them to derive general rules of behavior
to implement in the game. Co-evolution between arguments developed by teams playing
together is present: teams that tend to be more strategic tend to produce the opposite
attitude in other teams over time.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature; Section 3
presents the game, and illustrates the experimental design and implementation; Section
4 presents experimental results on choice behavior, distinguishing between aggregate and
individual (team) behavior; Section 5 presents results on content analysis; ﬁnally, Section
6 oﬀers some conclusions and possible directions of future research.
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2 Literature Review
Congestion games can be deﬁned as participation games with negative feedback: players
must decide whether or not to participate in a certain activity, and the payoﬀ they gain
decreases in the number of other participants1. Market entry games belong to this class,
and were the ﬁrst to be investigated through laboratory experiments; in a market entry
game, every player faces the option of not entering one or more markets and getting a
`sure' payoﬀ (which can be either positive or zero), or entering a market in which payoﬀ
decreases (usually linearly) in the number of entrants, up to a certain capacity k, beyond
which payoﬀ from entry becomes negative.
The ﬁrst experiment on a market entry game revealed that groups of players coordi-
nated surprisingly well, the average number of entrants over time being very close to k
(Kahneman, 1988). Meyer et al. (1992) and Ochs (1990), on the other hand, pointed out
the diﬃculty of players to converge to pure strategy equilibria when more than one market
was introduced. Several subsequent experiments (Rapoport, 1995; Sundali et al., 1995;
Erev and Rapoport, 1998; Rapoport et al., 2000) have substantially conﬁrmed that ag-
gregate behavior in the game conforms surprisingly well to the Nash equilibrium solution,
and this regularity has been proven robust across a variety of diﬀerent parameters, such
as group size, entry costs, payoﬀ from staying out, number of markets among which to
choose, and information conditions. Other experiments (Duﬀy and Hopkins, 2005) show
that additional information increases the speed of convergence to the game pure strategy
equilibria. However, Nash equilibria often fail to account for the high between-subject
variability (Rapoport et al., 1998). In addition, individual behavior analysis reveals that
players rarely conform to the predictions implied by the game Nash equilibrium, whether
pure or mixed; rather, the data show a high and persistent degree of heterogeneity between
subjects' decision rules combined with a large within-subject variability in the decisions
taken across iterations of the same stage game (See Erev and Rapoport (1998); Rapoport
1In opposition, participation games with positive feedback are those in which individual payoﬀs increase
in the number of participants, so that the Pareto-optimal equilibrium implies that all players participate.
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et al. (1998)). Finally, while individual behavior cannot usually be accounted for by any
model that assumes randomization, simple reinforcement-based decision rules that con-
dition the choice in one round to the payoﬀ obtained in the previous round(s) describes
behavior in these games quite accurately (Erev and Rapoport, 1998; Rapoport et al., 1998,
2000). Zwick and Rapoport (2002), however, have shown that no convergence to equilib-
rium play is observed even at the aggregate level when the payoﬀ function is not linear
and when costs of deviations from equilibrium play are substantially increased.
Route choice games are another category of congestion games, in which, unlike market
entry games, there is no `safe' option, and all the alternatives lead to a payoﬀ that de-
pends on how many players have selected them. Usually, however, the pure strategy Nash
equilibria of route choice games are payoﬀ-equivalent, and hence more stable than in the
minority game. Selten et al. (2002) have run a route choice game in which players had to
choose between a main road (M) and a side road (S); individual travel time was inversely
related to payoﬀ and depended on how many travelers had chosen each road. In one of two
information treatments, players received information only about traveling time in the road
chosen, while in the other treatment players had information about traveling time in both
roads. The authors ﬁnd that the mean number of travelers of each road is very close to the
equilibrium value, and that providing information about both traveling times signiﬁcantly
reduces (though not to zero) ﬂuctuations around the equilibrium. In a related experiment,
Selten et al. (2007) have subjects play a route choice game for 200 rounds, again running
two information treatments as in the previous experiment: they ﬁnd out that, while the
mean numbers of travelers on both roads tends to be always close to equilibrium values,
ample ﬂuctuations are observed that do not tend to diminish with time, despite the high
number of periods. Moreover, additional information reduces these ﬂuctuations, but not
substantially. The authors also ﬁnd heterogeneity in behavior, and the emergence of two
main response modes: a direct response mode, by which a road change follows a bad pay-
oﬀ, and a contrary response mode, by which a road change follows a good payoﬀ. Their
simulations with agents using the two response modes plus pure strategies (i.e., choosing
always the same road no matter what) replicate their experimental ﬁndings quite closely.
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The third class of congestion games includes minority games. The minority game diﬀers
from the other congestion games in its very unstable equilibrium structure: its Nash equi-
libria in pure strategies, whereby players sort themselves by side chosen, are non-strict and
payoﬀ-asymmetric. This property, combined with the absence of any symmetry-breaking
feature or similar potential coordination devices, makes the unique mixed strategy equilib-
rium a `natural' behavioral benchmark. However, randomizing in the game is rational only
insofar as all players in the game randomize: otherwise, it may be more rewarding in terms
of payoﬀ to try to predict and outsmart other players' behavior. These attempts may in
turn produce eﬃcient coordination at the aggregate level if the diﬀerent rules of behavior
developed somehow `cancel out'. Minority games were at ﬁrst studied extensively within
the econophysics literature, through simulations and analytical models2. Many of these
studies were motivated by the model of inductive reasoning developed in Arthur (1994),
and were aimed at identifying the conditions that allow aggregate eﬃciency to emerge from
the interaction of agents endowed with choice heuristics in the form of "`if...then"' rules
(see also Kets (2007), and Kets and Voorneveld (2007), for an account of learning mod-
els from the minority game literature in econophysics, and their comparison with standard
game-theoretic learning models). Experimental studies on the minority game (Bottazzi and
Devetag, 2007) have shown that groups of ﬁve players are able to coordinate eﬃciently,
although individual behavior does not conform to equilibrium; in addition, the availability
of full information increases the use of pure strategies that prescribe sorting. Finally, the
path of play shows evidence of mutual adaptation between players' strategies over time.
Chmura et al. (2010) test the extent to which subjects conform to the symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium in a minority game, by implementing incentives that allow subjects to
pick strategies randomly. Their results show that only 25% of their experimental subjects
decide to choose according to a coin toss, while the majority implement a decision rule that
can be adequately described by a reinforcement learning model. Belief learning models on
the contrary have low predictive success, which is line with the fact that participants mainly
2For a large collection of papers concerning both the analytical and numerical explorations of the
original minority game and various extensions see also http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/.
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collect information about past payoﬀs. Chmura et al. (2010) conclude that the observed
heterogeneity in players' behavior in games where multiple equivalent equilibria are present
must be ascribed to the structure of individuals' preferences rather than to their inability
to calculate mixed equilibria. Finally, Liu et al. (2010) study minority game properties
by comparing behavior in the game played by humans and by ﬁsh, and discover several
behavioral similarities between the two species.
3 The experiment: design and implementation
In a minority game, N agents (with N odd) have to pick one of two actions or sides, say
0 or 1, without communicating. The earnings for picking side i at time t are expressed by
the following function, equal for all players:
pii,t =
 1 if ni,t ≤ (N − 1)/20 otherwise (1)
where i ∈ {1, 0} and ni,t ∈ {1, ..., N} is the number of players choosing side i. In our
experiment N = 3, consequently participants earn 1 if they pick the choice not taken
by the other two players, while in the opposite case they earn zero. In our setting, a
decisional unit corresponding to a participant, is composed of three subjects that we call
team. Consequently, in our experiment, 3 teams of 3 players each played a minority game
that lasted for 100 rounds. We denote the three teams expressing decisions in the same
experimental session a group. From now on we will use the term `team' to indicate the 3-
person decisional unit or player, while we will use the term `group' for the entity composed
by the three teams playing together. In each round, teams had to choose between two
actions that were labeled A and B, and a minority rule determined team payoﬀ. A total of
108 experimental subjects, divided in 12 sessions, participated in this experiment. Subjects
belonging to a session showed up at the speciﬁed time and were all accommodated in a room
where instructions for the experiment were distributed and read aloud (see Instructions in
the Appendix). Each subject had to sign a consent form to allow video-recording of the
10
team discussion. After this part was over, subjects were instructed to exit the room one at
a time; once out of the room, each subject had to extract a card from an urn containing 9
cards reporting the names of the three diﬀerent rooms that were used as locations for the
diﬀerent teams (for each room name, there were 3 cards reporting that name). The subject
hence was accompanied to the assigned room. This procedure assured that each subject
only knew the composition of his/her own team (which was determined randomly anyway)
but did not know the composition of the other two teams. Once all subjects had been
accompanied to the assigned rooms, the experiment could start and the video-recording
device was turned on. There was only one computer and one video-recording device in each
room. Choices in the game were computerized (Fig. 3 shows a sample of the graphical
interface used), but the software did not allow any form of inter-team communication other
than through the choices made. One experimenter was always present in each room in case
some unexpected event occurred (such as, e.g., hardware failure).
Figure 1: Experimental software screen.
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In order to test the eﬀect of the diﬀerent amount of information available to subjects,
we conducted two treatments: in the Partial information treatment, teams received infor-
mation only about which choice had been the winning" choice after each round; in the
Full information treatment teams were also informed of the individual choices of all three
teams after each round. This information remained visible on the computer screen for the
entire game duration, so that each team had information about the entire game history up
to the current round.
Previous experiments have shown that the presence of a full information treatment has
an eﬀect on individual strategies; in particular, with full information more individuals tend
to follow pure strategies over time (i.e., choosing always the same action), and this behavior
has been shown to have, on average, an eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀect (Bottazzi and Devetag,
2007). We choose to implement the game for 100 rounds to allow teams to learn and
change their strategies in response to the behavior of other teams. Teams were instructed
to make their choices after free discussion with no time limits, and to try whenever possible
to reach unanimity; in case of disagreement, the majority rule had to be applied (for this
reason we ﬁxed team size equal to 3). In each round the minority" team was assigned one
Experimental Currency Unit (ECU), which was worth 0.75 euros. Hence, each team could
earn a maximum of 75 euros in the experiment, which had to be divided equally among the
team members. In addition, each subject was paid a show up fee of 3 euros. All payments
were made privately and in cash at the end of the experiment.
The experiment lasted two hours on average, with high variability between groups and
with a longer average time observed in the full information treatment. Average earnings
were equal to 18 euros.
4 Analysis of Choices
We ﬁrst analyze the `choice' data, separately for team and group behavior. We then turn
the attention to the analysis of the team discussion content.
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4.1 Allocative Eﬃciency
In this and the following sections we follow closely the analyses reported in Bottazzi and
Devetag (2007). We start by analyzing allocative eﬃciency, which we deﬁne simply as the
group payoﬀ, pigroup.
Group payoﬀ at time t can be deﬁned as
pigroup =
nA(t) if nA(t) < N/2N − nA(t) if nA(t) > N/2. (2)
where nA(t) is the number of players (teams) choosing action A at time t and N is the
total number of players (teams) in the game. In our case, as N = 3, the per-round group
payoﬀ can be either 0 or 1.
The benchmark that we use for the parameter pigroup corresponds to the value of alloca-
tive eﬃciency in the case of players who behave according to the symmetric mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium. In this case, the theoretical probability that exactly n players choose
action A, is the expected value calculated over a binomial distribution with parameters N
and n (as in Bottazzi and Devetag (2007)). In our case, N = 3 and n ∈ {0, ..., N},
thus the benchmark value of p¯i is 0.75. The value of allocative eﬃciency corresponding to
any of the game pure strategy Nash equilibria would equal 1. We investigate both overall
allocative eﬃciency and its variation over time.
Table 1 reports the values of allocative eﬃciency for each group, with the top (bottom)
half reporting values for the partial (full) information treatment. First, values of allocative
eﬃciency averaged across successive time intervals of 25 rounds are reported; the last row
reports the value computed over the entire game duration.
Looking at values in the last rows only, it is noteworthy that only two groups (group
2 and 12) exhibit a level of allocative eﬃciency below the theoretical benchmark of 0.75.
All remaining values are higher, with no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two treatments
(p=.29, Mann Whitney U test, two-tailed), although a higher average characterizes the
Full information treatment.
13
Looking at remaining values, we observe an increase in allocative eﬃciency over time,
with steadily decreasing standard errors. The phenomenon is more evident in the Full
Information treatment. Except for group 6, values in the last 25 rounds are always higher
(and in some cases remarkably so) than values in the ﬁrst 25 rounds, showing evidence of
learning and - possibly - mutual adaptation between team strategies.
Table 1 about here
In order to test whether the group condition made a diﬀerence in the aggregate with
respect to the individual condition, we compare our data with data from the experiment in
Bottazzi and Devetag (2007), in which groups of ﬁve subjects play a minority game. Their
experiment implements two diﬀerent information treatments as well, full and partial. In
order to compare the two sets of data obtained with diﬀerent group sizes, we divide each
group allocative eﬃciency value for the corresponding theoretical benchmark (equal to 0.75
in the group condition, and to 1.5625 in the individual condition); the normalized data
are then compared by using a Mann-Whitney U test, separately for the two information
treatments, so as to compare data obtained with diﬀerent group size but identical infor-
mation conditions: we observe no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in allocative eﬃciency, both for the
aggregate information treatment (p−value = .206, two-tailed, Mann Whitney U test) and
for the full information treatment (p − value = .061, two-tailed, Mann Whitney U test).
Hence, the group condition did not determine a diﬀerence in terms of aggregate eﬃciency
with respect to the individual condition; this result is important as it legitimates the use of
ﬁndings from the group discussion analysis to explain behavior in minority games with in-
dividual players. Concluding this section, aggregate results show high allocative eﬃciency
on average, and evidence of learning over time. Like in the minority game with individual
players, eﬃciency is higher in the full information treatment, although not signiﬁcantly so.
4.2 Individual (team) Behavior
In this section we analyze team choice behavior in the game. A binomial test performed
on choices pooled across treatments failed to reject the null hypothesis of no association
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between action label and choice3. Hence, we collapse our data across the label variable
(i.e., A or B).
We then computed the number of times that teams repeated their previous round choice
conditional on having been in the `minority' or `majority' side, i.e., on their previous round
payoﬀ having been 1 or 0. Table 2 reports the results.
The ﬁndings indicate a tendency to repeat previous round choices more often than what
would be implied by the mixed strategy equilibrium solution for both treatments, in line
with previous results (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007).
Table 2 about here
Finally, Table 3 reports the relative frequency of choices of action B in successive and
separate intervals of 25 rounds for each individual team. Values close to 0 or 1 signal
behavior approaching a pure strategy (i.e., always choosing the same action). Previous
experiments (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007) have revealed that, generally, the tendency to
follow pure strategies on the part of players increases over time, with a marked diﬀerence
depending on the information available: when players have full information about indi-
vidual choices, they tend to resort more often to pure strategies, and this behavior is, on
average, eﬃciency-enhancing. Pure strategies emerge from our data as well (e.g., in group
1, 3, 4, 8, 9 10 and 11), although no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in its frequency of use emerges
as a function of information availability.
Table 3 about here
Summing up the results from our choice behavior analysis, the following facts are worth
noticing: allocative eﬃciency is on average very high in all groups, conﬁrming previous
results and suggesting that coordination in the game is very successful with `small' (i.e.,
N=3,5) groups. There is evidence of learning, since coordination improves over time, and
this phenomenon appears more markedly in the full information treatment. Unlike previous
experiments, there is no evidence of an increased frequency of pure strategies when full
information is available. We now turn to the analysis of the team discussion content.
3Choices of A are 1811 over 3600, that is 50.3% of all choices (binomial test, p = .5.)
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5 Analysis of Strategies
In this section we present a content analysis of team discussions throughout the game.
We aim at understanding why certain choices are made, which strategies emerge more
frequently, and if and how people react to (or anticipate) the behavior of others. To
this end, we conduct a number of analyses. First, we examine what types of strategic
considerations are most common, and how these diﬀer between treatments (Section 5.1).
Then, we turn to the dynamics of various arguments and examine whether any change
in the group choice process over time can be identiﬁed (Section 5.2). Third, we study
whether and to what extent both, team payoﬀ and group allocative eﬃciency, depend
on the strategic considerations of the teams involved and on the types of arguments most
often used (Section 5.3). Fourth, we examine whether and how the strategic considerations
and choices of one team inﬂuence the considerations and subsequent choices of the other
interacting teams (Section 5.4).
We ﬁrst describe the method employed in detail. All team discussions in the experi-
ment were video-recorded and then transcribed in separate word ﬁles (there are a total of
36 video-recordings and transcript ﬁles), by reporting each complete or incomplete sentence
in a separate line, numbered progressively, and by identifying the speaker identity with a
numeric code (from 1 to 3). We were only interested in the spoken words; the video record-
ing was only used to allow unambiguous identiﬁcation of the speakers in case of partial
voice overlapping. Then, two sets of categories were created (see below for a description of
the categories used) and listed in a coding manual that informed the subsequent classiﬁca-
tion task: each transcript was classiﬁed by two independent classiﬁers who were involved
neither in the design of the experiment nor in its analysis. Each sentence in the transcript
had to be assigned to one and only one of two sets of distinct categories, to be considered
in a predetermined sequence. We used two diﬀerent and independent raters to control for
classiﬁcation quality. In the literature the Cohens Kappa coeﬃcient is normally employed
as a measure of interrater-reliability (Cohen 1960). Usually the classiﬁcations are said to
be reliable if the Cohens Kappa coeﬃcient is at least 0.7. The values of Cohens Kappa
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for our two classiﬁcations are equal to 0.699 and 0.68. Although this value is not entirely
satisfactory, we believe it is suﬃcient for our purposes. We restrict our analysis to those
classiﬁcations in which both raters agree.
Each sentence in the transcripts was classiﬁed twice: the ﬁrst classiﬁcation concerned
the type of argument, if any, that was contained in the sentence. We use the term 'argu-
ment' in a very general and comprehensive sense, i.e., as a statement or a set of statements
intended to provide support, justiﬁcation or evidence in favor of a proposal or proposition.
Arguments in our case may include statements that support a speciﬁc action in the game,
statements that point at evidence that may serve as reason or justiﬁcation for a speciﬁc
course of action, or simply descriptive statements that may be used within the team to
support or discourage a course of action (e.g., statements that describe the behavior of
other teams or that try to infer the use of speciﬁc strategies on the part of other teams,
or that refer to aspects of the game structure without explicit reference to actions and
players).
Table 4 reports the main categories that were employed for Classiﬁcation I. Each higher-
level category was subsequently subdivided in a certain number of sub-categories. The
categories and sub-categories were created with the intentions to be as comprehensive as
possible and to minimize ambiguity in the classiﬁcation task. The categories W and U are
built for all arguments with no content, either because they are incomplete or not under-
standable (U) or because a statement concerns a choice suggestion without providing any
explanation (W). Categories U and W are not analyzed further as they are not informative.
Table 4 about here
Classiﬁcation II concerns the type of action choice that was suggested or implied in the
statement. Typical examples are the suggestion to choose action A or B. However several
statements may concern more complex action choices, such as, for example, an alternating
sequence of actions or the suggestion to randomize. If statements do not contain any
suggestion on the action to choose, they are categorized in the second classiﬁcation as
belonging to class N. This class is not further investigated. A list of all categories used in
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the second classiﬁcation is provided in Table 5. All statements unambiguously unrelated
to the game were excluded from the classiﬁcation.
Table 5 about here
The categories used to classify the content of the discussion reﬂect the main types of
motives supporting the choice of a strategy in the minority game. Some of them derive
from results of previous experiments (e.g., Bottazzi and Devetag (2007)), others from game-
theoretic notions that refer to the pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the game
(for example, the strategy `randomize' refers to the prescription on behavior implied by the
unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game). Irrational motivations,
such as those based on intuition, were also included.
5.1 Frequency of categories
We ﬁrst present an overview of the most frequent categories of Classiﬁcation I and Classiﬁ-
cation II, across diﬀerent treatments. Let us begin with Classiﬁcation I, which concerns the
motivations behind choices and strategies. 66% of all arguments contained a proposal of a
speciﬁc action without providing a reason in support of that choice (Category W). State-
ments that could not be classiﬁed (Category U) are very rare, being only 1% of the total.
Among the remaining categories, O (`Others'), S (`Self'), G(`General') and P(`Patterns')
are the most frequent. Their shares in the two treatments are listed in Table 6.
Table 6 about here
A clear observation from the last column of Table 6 is that arguments of type O (`Oth-
ers') and S (`Self') are by far the most frequent, accounting for 53.5% and 32.5% of all
arguments, respectively. Hence, players spend most of the time discussing about others'
behavior and about their own history of actions and/or payoﬀs, with the ﬁrst class of argu-
ments being more prominent. Roughly 10% of the arguments are about identifying patterns
in the series of winning sides (P), and only 4% are devoted to a general understanding of
the game being played (G).
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Another observation concerns diﬀerences between treatments: the two distributions
are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (Chi-square test: p = .000) whereby in the partial information
treatment 47% of arguments concern the team's own history of actions and payoﬀs, and
only 40% concern the behavior of other players, while in the full information treatment
arguments about others' behavior raise to 67% and those concerning the team's own history
amount only for 18%. This diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant4. This ﬁnding is noteworthy for
two reasons: ﬁrst, it shows that in the absence of detailed information about each team's
individual choices, teams tend to focus mostly on their own behavior and do not pay much
attention to the behavior of others. Second, it shows that when more information about
others is made available, teams use it extensively, changing markedly the motivations at
the core of choices of actions, which become less self-centered and more strategic.
Table 7 reports the most frequent lower-level categories, divided by treatment. The
distributions in the partial and full information treatment are again signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(Chi-square test: p = .000). Players most frequently try to predict others' choices in
the next round (Op with 35.5%, such as `this team always chooses B'), or try to infer
predictable patterns in their choices (Sp with 26%), followed by considerations on other
teams' choices in the previous round or in the past (Ol, 19.5%)5, and by the team own
unsuccessful choices (Sn, 14.5%). Finally, only 4% of the statements concern beliefs of other
players. However, the percentage passes from 2% in the partial information treatment to
6% in the full information treatment. Hence, full information increases the tendency to
consider other players' beliefs when choosing. Finally, only 2% of the statements concern
attempts at inﬂuencing other teams' behavior, and 3% concern possible reactions of other
teams to one's team behavior. Regarding diﬀerences between treatments, the table shows
that all subclasses concerning others' behavior increase markedly in the presence of full
information, while those related to the team own previous history decrease substantially.
Table 7 about here
4p = .004, Mann-Whitney U test, two-tailed, 6 observations per treatment
5We use here the term `player' and `team' interchangeably, to refer to the game decisional entity.
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Hence, we ﬁnd that the vast majority of relevant arguments in the game is based either
on one's own history of past successes/failures, which is consistent with low-rationality,
backward-looking decision rules, or on other players' behavior. In the absence of feed-
back about individual choices of others, arguments about self are the most prominent.
In addition, when players do reason about others, they do not seem to develop complex
multiple-round strategies or considerations, nor to reason about others beliefs, but mostly
they focus on other's observed choices.
The fact that people do rarely develop sophisticated strategies in the minority game is
further supported by our ﬁndings regarding Classiﬁcation II, concerning choice suggestions.
Statements that do not contain a clear proposal on what to do are classiﬁed as N and not
analyzed further.
Except for class N, the most frequent categories are A, B, SQ, C and F. Table 8 lists
the shares of statements that fall into these categories.
Table 8 about here
Categories A and B are by far the most frequent, accounting for about 80% of choice
suggestions altogether. Summing the shares of categories C and F to this value, it can
be noted that nearly 90% of statements concern choice suggestions that involve only the
successive round of play. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between treatments here as well
(Chi-square test: p=.000). The category SQ(`Sequence'), which contains statements that
suggest more complex (i.e., multiple round) strategies, accounts only for 9% of the state-
ments. Interestingly, the frequency of SQ statements in the partial information treatment
is more than double that of SQ statements in the full information treatment, and this
diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (Chi-square test: p=.000). This ﬁnding suggests that when
feedback about others is limited, players tend to resort more to strategies that do not
condition team behavior on the behavior of other teams6. It is noteworthy that Category
6Note that with a group size equal to 3, the information about one's own payoﬀ in a round is suﬃcient
to determine the entire choice distribution in the group in that round. The diﬀerence between the two
information treatments lies in the possibility to know which of the other two teams made a certain choice,
hence to keep track of each team history throughout the game.
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R (`Randomize'), which corresponds to the prescription implied by the unique symmet-
ric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium contains only the 0.6% of the statements, with no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between treatments (p = .11).
Hence, the mixed strategy equilibrium solution is unsupported by the results of our
analysis: this ﬁnding conﬁrms the results in Chmura et al. (2010) obtained by considering
choice data. We can hence state that behaviors incompatible with the mixed strategy
equilibrium do not derive from players' imperfect ability to randomize, but from players
not intentionally pursuing this type of strategy.
F(`Fixed') and C (`Change') prescribe `stay with previous round choice' and `change
with respect to previous round choice', respectively. The share of F is higher in the full
information treatment, and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant (Chi-square test: p = .002). The
same holds for the share of C (Chi-square test: p = .005). Observing the course of action
of other teams helps players in the full information treatment to position themselves, at
least in some runs of the game, on a pure Nash equilibrium and to lock one of the other
two players in a losing position.
Class SQ (`Sequences') is the category that contains suggestions on sequences of choices
that extend for more than one round: the main subclasses of SQ and their shares are listed
in Table 9.
Table 9 about here
We ﬁnd that the most frequent action suggestion is that of sticking to the same side (SQf,
SQa and SQb), which account for the 63% of suggestions. The proposal to alternate
between A and B account for 20% (SQs), while other sequences count for the remaining
17% (SQo).
Interestingly, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the treatments (Chi-square test:
p = .001). More speciﬁcally, suggestions to alternate choices (SQs) are more frequent in
the partial information treatment (Chi-square test: p = .0001; one-tailed, Mann-Whitney
U test: p = .002). Categories SQf, SQa and SQb (which can be summed up as they refer
to the same strategy of sticking with the same choice) instead are more frequent in the full
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information treatment, although the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant (Chi-square
test: p = .19). The latter subcategories may be thought as supporting a Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies which prescribes sorting, i.e., players diﬀerentiating on the basis of the
action chosen. The fact that these suggestions appear more frequently in the presence of
full information is compatible with data on higher-level classes (i.e., the diﬀerence between
the shares of class F above), and with data on choice behavior from this experiment as well
as from previous experiments with individual players (Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007; Duﬀy
and Hopkins, 2005): in both cases the emergence of sorting is more frequent when full
information is available. This is conﬁrmed by our discussion content analysis, although it
has to be noted that class SQ is less frequent in the full information treatment. This latter
ﬁnding shows that when full information is available, players tend to be more `myopic',
not planning courses of action that extend beyond the current round.
Category D is very rare and no statement was classiﬁed in category X. Finally, almost
no suggestions belonged to Category Sc, containing `cooperative' strategy suggestions,
such as the proposal to alternate with other teams in being on the winning side. This
collusive strategy is not trivial to implement in a game like the minority game, but the
full informational feedback renders it in principle more easily applicable. However, despite
the presence of some such suggestions in the full information treatment, their frequency
(0.1%) is negligible.
5.2 Evolution of arguments and actions over time
In order to analyze the evolution of arguments and strategies over time, we subsequently
partitioned the whole sequence of statements within each team into ﬁve parts each con-
taining an equal number of statements. This temporal division does not necessarily mirror
an equal division of the rounds of play, since the discussion intensity throughout the game
may not have been uniformly distributed. Again we only consider the most frequent cate-
gories of both classiﬁcations. We report relative frequencies of main classes and subclasses
of Classiﬁcation I and Classiﬁcation II in the ﬁrst and ﬁfth part of the game in Table 10.
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We also report the results of a nonparametric Wilcoxon signed rank test that has been
used to detect signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
Table 10 about here
As far as the ﬁrst classiﬁcation is concerned, the following facts emerge: ﬁrst, in both
treatments a signiﬁcant increase in the share of S arguments can be detected, together
with an equally signiﬁcant decrease in the share of O arguments. Hence, regardless of
the information available, over time teams seem to become more and more self-centered.
Second, the eﬀect of full information seems strongest at the beginning of the game, given
that in the ﬁrst part the share of O arguments is almost 80%, compared to 46% of the partial
information treatment. The remaining two classes, G and P, do not show signiﬁcant time-
dependent patterns. The data on subclasses reveal that the argument mostly responsible for
the decrease in the O class over time is Op (`arguments about other teams' behavior in the
next round or other teams' behavior or strategy without reference to a period'). However, a
diﬀerence emerges between the two treatments: while in the partial information treatment
the share of Op decreases signiﬁcantly, in the full information treatment that of Op remains
invariant. A signiﬁcant shift happens in the S subclasses for the Full Treatment: the share
of Sp almost doubles from beginning to end, whereas that of Sn decreases substantially.
These results can be interpreted by taking into account the role of information: in the
partial information treatment, teams' attention toward trying to spot and predict other
teams' strategies (Op) declines because of the inherent diﬃculty of doing so given the
absence of individual information. There is a slight increase in arguments concerning
others' behavior in the previous round, but it is not signiﬁcant. In the full information
treatment, on the contrary, attention to others' behavior remains high (Op), but as the
game progresses and the history of past choices and outcomes becomes longer and richer,
teams start paying more and more attention to their own past behavior (Sp increases) to
try to detect successful patterns. In the absence of history the attitude is less backward-
looking and more strategic. One could say that the longer the past, the more it inﬂuences
the future. The data from the second classiﬁcation reveal no signiﬁcant changes in the
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aggregate (last column of the table). However, in the full information treatment the share
of SQ (`Sequences that involve more than one round') increases from 2% to 10%, indicating
that the combination of full information and a longer available history of play gives rise to
the elaboration of more sophisticated, multiple-round strategies, probably based on those
patterns that the team identiﬁes as having been successful in the past.
5.3 Arguments and eﬃciency
In this section we investigate whether the performance of teams and groups depends on the
types of arguments brought up in the discussion. To this end, we use OLS regression models
with team payoﬀ and group allocative eﬃciency as dependent variables, and the shares of
categories of arguments and actions as independent variables. We have 36 observations for
team payoﬀ and 12 observations for allocative eﬃciency. We apply a simple cross section
regression. As done before, we only use the most frequent categories. For each dependent
variable we perform three regressions. The ﬁrst includes the categories of Classiﬁcation I:
O, S, G and P. The second includes the most frequently observed subcategories of O and
S: Ol, Op, Ob, Sp and Sn. The third takes into account the categories of Classiﬁcation II:
A, B, SQ, C and F.
We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant dependence of team payoﬀ on the main categories of
reasoning considered. However, we observe a highly signiﬁcant positive dependence of
team payoﬀ on the subcategory Ob (see Table 11) from which we deduce that teams
obtain, on average, a higher payoﬀ if they reason more about other teams' beliefs. This
is by far the most complex subcategory of reasoning among those frequently used: being
able to hold second order beliefs (i.e., beliefs about others' beliefs) seems advantageous in
the minority game.
Table 11 about here
Studying the categories of action, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant results only if we use a 90%
signiﬁcance level (see the ﬁrst two columns of Table 12). However, these slightly signiﬁcant
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results are very interesting: teams that frequently support the option of sticking to previous
round choice (Class F) obtain higher payoﬀs, while teams that frequently argue to change
action (Class C) obtain smaller payoﬀs.
Table 12 about here
This result partly holds also for groups allocative eﬃciency. Table 12 shows a positive
and weakly signiﬁcant dependence of allocative eﬃciency on the share of statements that
propose to repeat the previous period choice.
The above analysis uses statements within teams as independent variables. These
statements represent intentions and beliefs but not actual choices of actions. Hence, we
repeat the above regressions using the number of actual choice changes from one round to
the next as an additional independent variable. The results are reported in the last two
columns of Table 12.
Indeed, for team performance we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative dependence on the number
of actual choice changes. However, this does only partly eliminate the dependence on team
discussion. The frequency of arguments in favor of repeating previous round choice (F) is
still positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with team payoﬀ. Hence, both actual choices
and discussions in the team matter for the ﬁnal outcome. This is conﬁrmed by considering
that the number of arguments in favor of changing choice is not signiﬁcantly correlated
with the number of actual choice changes (correlation coeﬃcient: -0.161; p-value: 0.347).
In the case of allocative eﬃciency, all signiﬁcant relationships disappear if both the
frequency of arguments and the frequency of choice changes are considered.
5.4 Interdependence between groups
The aim of our ﬁnal analysis is to test whether arguments brought up within one team
have an inﬂuence on the arguments in other teams with which the team interacts. Again
we only focus on the most frequent types of arguments. Looking at categories of reasoning,
O and S are the most frequent. We test whether the share of these two categories depends
on the share in other teams.
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Again we separate the arguments into three parts: the initial part with the ﬁrst ﬁfth
of arguments, the end part with the last ﬁfth of arguments, and the middle part with the
remaining arguments. We use the share of Categories O and S in the end part as dependent
variables.
To test interdependence between teams we use the share of the two categories, O and
S, in the other two teams in the middle part; denoted by Oo2 and So2, respectively. If
the reasoning in other teams has an inﬂuence we should see a reaction in the end part
of the game to the reasoning of other teams in the middle part. However, teams might
also have fundamental tendencies to use certain kinds of arguments more than others. In
order to capture the existence of these basic tendencies, we use the shares of O and S
within a team in the initial part as further independent variables, denoted by O1 and S1,
respectively. Finally, we include two control variables: a dummy for the full information
treatment (TD), and one for the number of wins of the considered team in the middle
part (Win2). The latter control variable captures the fact that a team discussion might be
inﬂuenced, among other things, by the team's previous success. We report the results of
the regressions in Table 13.
In a further step, we analyze the Subclasses Ol, Op, Ob, Sp and Sn in the same way as
we did for the Classes O and S. The results are presented in Table 14.
First, we ﬁnd that there is, indeed, a basic tendency within teams that determines the
most frequent statements. This holds especially for arguments of Class O: teams that make
a lot of O statements at the beginning also make a lot of O statements at the end of the
game (see Table 13).
In the case of Class S we also ﬁnd a high coeﬃcient for the dependence of the share
of this kind of statement at the end on the share of the same statement at the beginning.
However, this coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. This makes it impossible to conclude whether
the above ﬁnding also holds for Class S or whether Class S is diﬀerent from Class O. We
tend to believe the former.
Besides this persistence eﬀect, we ﬁnd two types of dependencies on the events in the
game. First, the statements at the end of the game depend on the number of wins in
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the middle part. Table 13 clearly shows that a higher number of wins in the middle part
is correlated with more S arguments and less O arguments in the last part. There are
two alternative interpretations for this ﬁnding. On the one hand, teams that make more
extensive use of S arguments in the middle part might be more successful in this part and
keep a high share of S arguments in the last part. However, above we found no correlation
between S arguments and team success. On the other hand, success might lead teams to
focus more on their own behavior and what has made them successful, while losing teams
tend to focus on other players instead. Table 14 shows that success (high winning rates)
in the middle part leads to a higher number of Sp statements in the last part of the game.
Hence, the main consequence of success is that people look backward to try to identify
what made them successful.
Second, we ﬁnd that statements of Class O are less frequent in the end part if the
other teams have frequently used the same type of statements in the middle part. This
result is diﬃcult to interpret. Again we refer to the results on the subclasses (presented in
Table 14), which show that statements of Class Ob become less frequent in the end part if
other teams use statements of Class O. Hence, if the other two teams are more focused on
other teams, the team tends to become less focused on other teams.
This result is interesting for two, related reasons: ﬁrst, it shows evidence of mutual
dependence between teams' arguments and motivations, showing in particular that having
more strategic partners in the game (whereby strategic means more focused on others) leads
to being less strategic and less sophisticated. Second, this mutual dependence emerges in a
situation in which teams have no access whatsoever to other teams' internal discussions,
but only to their choices: nevertheless, teams are able to deeply inﬂuence each other's
motivations. This complementary relation (more O arguments leading to less O arguments
on the part of competing teams) may be responsible for the mutual adaptation and co-
evolution of choices in the minority game and, ultimately, for the high levels of eﬃciency
observed. It is left to explain why a negative correlation emerges, which could be object
of future research.
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6 Conclusions
The main aim of this work was to investigate motivations and intentions laying behind
actions and strategies in minority games. In order to do so, we implemented a minority of
three game played by teams of three players, where decisions had to be discussed in front of
a camera and subsequently analyzed by means of content analysis (Hennig-Schmidt, 1999).
Several results of our analysis are noteworthy: ﬁrst, a strong similarity emerges between
aggregate behavior in minority games played by individual decision makers and those
played by teams: as in Bottazzi and Devetag (2007), in our experiments allocative eﬃciency
is on average remarkably high, and mostly higher than the mixed strategy equilibrium
benchmark, conﬁrming that coordination in minority games played by humans is very
successful with small groups; moreover, coordination tends to improve over time, which
suggests that teams learn and co-evolve as the game progresses.
The core of our experiment is the identiﬁcation of the types of arguments (Classiﬁca-
tion I) and suggestions for action (Classiﬁcation II), obtained through Content Analysis
(Hennig-Schmidt, 1999) performed on the transcripts of the discussions that took place
among team members prior to any decision in the game. Our results show that partic-
ipants spend most of their time discussing about other teams' behavior and about their
own history of actions and/or payoﬀs, while only rarely they try to identify patterns in the
series of 'winning sides' or attempt a general understanding of the game that would allow
them to derive general rules of behavior.
The second result worth noticing, is that the introduction of a full information treat-
ment produces statistically signiﬁcant changes in subjects' behavior, in line with previous
results ((Bottazzi and Devetag, 2007; Duﬀy and Hopkins, 2005): In the full treatment in
fact participants tend to use more arguments related to others' behavior and less argu-
ments related with their own, showing as expected, that more information about others is
actively used in that it reﬂects in a larger consideration of their moves. Nonetheless, this
diﬀerence does not imply a higher level of rationality on the part of subjects: as a matter of
fact, looking at the lower level classiﬁcation (Classiﬁcation I sub-classes), subjects search
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predictable patterns in others' past choices (Op) or in their own past successful choices
(Sp), according to a backward-looking, low-rationality approach.
The latter statement is conﬁrmed also by the second classiﬁcation, where 90 per cent
of statements relate to choices that involve only the next round of play, while multiple-
round strategies (Sequences, 'SQ') account for at most 9 per cent. It is worth noticing
how multiple-round strategies tend to decrease from partial to full treatment. When full
information is available, players tend to be more `myopic', not planning courses of action
that extend beyond the current round; alternatively, one could argue that with full in-
formation players tend to condition choices in each round to the observation of others'
choices in the previous round, whereas the partial information treatment promotes the use
of unconditional rules (i.e., rules that do not condition one's behavior on the behavior of
others).
The third result refers to the 'Randomization' category, the strategy implied by the
unique symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: such a randomization is only proposed
in a negligible percentage of statements which, as in Bottazzi and Devetag (2007), further
decrease when full information is introduced. This result conﬁrms previous ﬁndings -
obtained from analyzing choice data in previous minority games experiments (Chmura
et al., 2010). Hence, we can conclude that the absence of evidence compatible with the
mixed strategy equilibrium does not derive from players' imperfect ability to randomize
but from players not intentionally pursuing this type of strategy.
In addition, important ﬁndings concern the time dimension: ﬁrst, regardless of the
information treatment, teams tend to become more self-centered and less focused on other
players over time, and more so the more successful a team has been. The length of one's
history (i..e, the number of past rounds of play) determines the extent to which a team
will be focused on its past behavior as opposed to being focused on the behavior of others.
This tendency is reinforced by success; the more successful a team has been, the more it
will resort to analysis of its past behavior to ﬁnd ways to be successful in the future.
The last ﬁnding points at the evidence of a temporal co-evolution between arguments
developed by teams playing together: more speciﬁcally, teams that tend to be more strate-
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gic (i.e., more allocentric) tend to produce the opposite attitude in other teams over time.
Future research will have to disentangle the motivations behind this ﬁnding.
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Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Allocative Eﬃciency calculated over successive time intervals of 25 rounds and
reported separately per each group and treatment. The top (bottom) panel reports data
for the Partial (Full) information treatment. The last row of each panel reports the value
of allocative eﬃciency calculated over the entire 100 rounds of play.
Allocative Eﬃciency in Time and per group
Partial Info Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6
1-25 0.68 0.68 0.8 0.72 0.64 0.84
26-50 0.76 0.64 0.68 1 0.88 0.8
51-75 0.92 0.8 0.88 1 0.76 0.76
76-100 0.88 0.76 1 0.96 0.88 0.88
1-100 0.81 0.72 0.84 0.92 0.79 0.82
Full Info Group 7 Group 8 Group 9 Group 10 Group 11 Group 12
1-25 0.68 0.68 0.88 0.68 0.84 0.64
26-50 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.56
51-75 0.84 1 0.96 0.96 0.76 0.76
76-100 0.88 1 1 1 0.84 0.92
1-100 0.82 0.91 0.96 0.9 0.88 0.72
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Table 2: Relative frequency of choices(t)=choices(t− 1) conditional on the payoﬀ(t− 1)=1
or payoﬀ(t− 1)=0.
Partial Info
Teams c(t+ 1) = c(t) Stand. c(t+ 1) = c(t) Stand.
if pi(t) = 1 Dev . if pi(t) = 0 Dev.
1 0.79 0.09 0.63 0.23
2 0.74 0.14 0.67 0.17
3 0.72 0.21 0.73 0.17
4 0.79 0.14 0.81 0.11
5 0.71 0.18 0.71 0.03
6 0.58 0.18 0.61 0.13
Avg. 0.72 0.15 0.69 0.14
Full Info
Teams c(t+ 1) = c(t) Stand. c(t+ 1) = c(t) Stand.
if pi(t) = 1 Dev . if pi(t) = 0 Dev.
7 0.69 0.12 0.70 0.12
8 0.78 0.06 0.87 0.03
9 0.83 0.07 0.85 0.04
10 0.88 0.09 0.81 0.04
11 0.80 0.13 0.77 0.10
12 0.56 0.08 0.55 0.07
Avg. 0.76 0.09 0.76 0.07
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Table 3: For each team, the relative frequency of choices=B in the diﬀerent game intervals.
The left (right) panel reports values for the Partial (Full) information treatment.
Partial Information Full Information
Time span Group 1 Group 7
1-25 0.56 0.40 0.44 0.36 0.32 0.72
26-50 0.56 0.08 0.48 0.24 0.52 0.68
51-75 0.72 0 0.64 0.36 0.72 0.68
76-100 0.76 0 0.68 0.48 0.56 0.56
Group 2 Group 8
1-25 0.44 0.36 0.56 0.44 0.4 0.44
26-50 0.4 0.88 0.76 0.72 0.48 0.16
51-75 0.56 0.68 0.24 0.36 1 0
76-100 0.44 0.44 0.72 0 0.96 0.6
Group 3 Group 9
1-25 0.44 0.36 0.48 0.28 0.64 0.44
26-50 0.28 0.64 0.6 0 0.52 0.88
51-75 0.28 0.52 0.88 0.8 0.52 0.24
76-100 0 0.4 1 0.96 0.2 0.2
Group 4 Group 10
1-25 0.56 0.40 0.48 0.48 0.72 0.48
26-50 0.48 0.24 0.64 0.2 1 0.6
51-75 0 0.6 0.92 0.04 0.96 0.52
76-100 0.04 0.48 0.92 0 0.96 0.4
Group 5 Group11
1-25 0.16 0.6 0.44 0.64 0.44 0.6
26-50 0.52 0.28 0.64 0.28 0.48 0.52
51-75 0.48 0.4 0.88 0.32 0.8 0.44
76-100 0.36 0.64 0.52 0.48 0.96 0.2
Group 6 Group 12
1-25 0.4 0.56 0.56 0.6 0.56 0.56
26-50 0.24 0.76 0.52 0.48 0.6 0.48
51-75 0.52 0.4 0.52 0.44 0.52 0.52
76-100 0.16 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.52 0.52
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Table 4: Classiﬁcation I: types of arguments and relative subcategories with a brief de-
scription.
Cat Argument
W-W/out Suggestions on the action to choose without providing any reason
Ww: Without a clear relation to former reasoning
Wr: With a clear relation to former reasoning
Wc: Statements that show agreement with a previously stated argument
Wd: Statements that show disagreement with a previously stated argument
w/o providing a reason for disagreement
U-n/und. Arguments in which the reasoning is incomplete or not understandable
S-Self Argument concerning a pay-oﬀ or success that the team has achieved in the past
Sp-self past success: Arguments in which a strategy applied in the past is observed
to be successful
Sn-self past not succ.: Arguments in which a strategy applied in the past is
observed to be unsuccessful
So-more(Sm): Other arguments about past successes or failures
O-Others Arguments that concern other teams
Oi-inﬂuence: Argument that suggest to try to inﬂuence the behavior of others
by making a choice
Or-react: Statements about how other groups react on one's own team behavior
Ol-last round: Statements about the choice of other groups in the last round
not used to make a prediction for future behavior
Op-next period: Statements on the behavior of other teams in the next period,
or on other teams' strategy or behavior without reference to a speciﬁc period
Ob-beliefs: Statements about the beliefs of other teams about one's own team
Ot-theorizing: Theorizing on the reasons why other teams behave in a certain way.
P-Patterns Argument that concerns the past sequence of `winning' choices
Pp: w/out providing an explanation
Pt-theorizing : theorizing about the structure of the sequence of the winning choice
Pl-likelihood: Statements about the likelihood of each option to be winning
Po: Statements about which team always wins or loses
G-General Argument in which a general understanding of the game is developed
Gs-self : consideration that have the aim to obtain the best results for themselves
Gc-coop.: Considerations with the aim to make all the groups similarly well-oﬀ
Go-more(Gm): Other considerations that reveal a general understanding
or interpretation of the game
I-Intuition Argument based on Intuition, gut feeling, or just guessing
Is: Arguments about guesses on what would be a good choice or the winning choice
M-More Further motives
Mb-boredom: Arguments that propose a change of strategy or a choice just
because of boredom
Mt: Statements that propose a decision to just speed up the game
Mi: arguments that propose a choice since the person does not care about the game.
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Table 5: Classiﬁcation II: Categories of the classiﬁcation concerning the type of action
choice that was suggested or implied in the sentence with a brief description.
Cat. Argument
A-Choose A Choosing A in this round without any statement about what to do in the next rounds
B-Choose B Choosing B in this round without any statement about what to do in the next rounds
C-Change Change choice next round without a statement about the further strategy or behavior
Ca-Change to A: Change of choice to A. In contrast to A and C, in this case both `A'
and`changing behavior' are mentioned in the statement
Cb-Change to B: Change of choice to B. `B' and `changing behavior' are mentioned
F-Fixed Stick with previous choice this time without a statement about the further strategy
or behavior
SQ-Sequences Sequences (proposals for more than one round)
SQs-alternating: Alternating choices
SQf-ﬁxed: Fixed choices without a statement about which choice should be repeated
SQa-always A: Fixed choice with always choosing A
SQb-always B: Fixed choice with always choosing B
SQc-cooperate: Cooperative strategy that causes each group to win alternatively
SQo-other sequences(m more?): Other sequences, such as A-B-B-A-B-B-...
R-Randomize Intentionally randomise
CC-Copycat Do the same as the other team(s)
D-Dependence Dependence on history
Dw-past win: dependence on past winning choice
Do-past others: dependence on the past decisions of others
Ds-past self : dependence on the decisions made by themselves in the past
Dp-past payoﬀs: dependence on past payoﬀs, for example `we change if we lost'
Dn-past wins: dependence on the number of times in which one's own team has won
Dm-past wins of others: dependence on the number of times in which other teams
have won
Dc-past comparison: dependence on the comparison between number of times
in which one's own team won and the other groups won
X-Null suggestion Statement of somebody who does not know what and suggests to just make a random decision
N-Not clear No clear proposal for what to do either now or in the future37
Table 6: Share of statements of Classiﬁcation I that are categorized into the classes O, S,
G and P for the two treatments. Values are expressed in percentages.
Classiﬁcation I
Category Partial Info Full Info Total
O - Others 40 67 53.5
S - Self 47 18 32.5
G - General 4.5 4.2 4.35
P - Patterns 8.6 10 9.3
Table 7: Share of statements of Classiﬁcation I that are categorized into the subclasses Ol,
Op, Ob, Sp and Sn for the two treatments. Values are expressed in percentages.
Classiﬁcation I - Sub-categories
Category Partial Info Full Info Total
Ol 13 26 19.5
Op 27 44 35.5
Ob 2 6 4
Sp 37 15 26
Sn 21 8 14.5
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Table 8: Share of statements of Classiﬁcation II that are categorized into the classes A, B,
SQ, C and F for the two treatments. Values are expressed in percentages.
Classiﬁcation II
Category Partial Info Full Info Total
A - choose A 38 39 38.5
B - choose B 40 42 41
SQ - sequences 13 6 9.5
C - change 3.2 5.2 4.2
F - ﬁxed 4.9 7.5 5.25
R - randomize 0.8 0.4 0.6
Table 9: Share of statements of Classiﬁcation II belonging to category SQ('Sequences'),
detailed for its subclasses Ss, Sf, Sa, Sb and So.
Classiﬁcation II - sub-categories
Category Partial Info Full Info Total
Ss 29 9.7 19.35
Sf 8.9 10.7 9.8
Sa 27 30.1 28.5
Sb 23 26 24.5
So 11.6 23.3 17.45
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Table 10: Relative frequencies of main classes and subclasses of Classiﬁcation I and Classi-
ﬁcation II within the ﬁrst and the last ﬁfth part of the game. P-values show the signiﬁcance
of the changes in time, calculated with the Chi-square test).
Classiﬁcation I
Partial info Full info Both
Cat. 1st 5th p-val 1st 5th p-val 1st 5th p-val
O 0.46 0.29 .04 0.78 0.53 .02 0.62 0.41 .027
S 0.33 0.55 .04 0.13 0.29 .02 0.23 0.42 .028
G 0.09 0.03 .14 0.07 0.09 .6 0.08 0.06 .46
P 0.04 0.07 .89 0.02 0.02 .7 0.03 0.05 .89
Sub. Cat. 1st 5th p-val 1st 5th p-val 1st 5th p-val
Ol 0.18 0.26 .3 0.34 0.32 .2 0.26 0.29 .75
Op 0.56 0.24 .02 0.49 0.46 .7 0.52 0.35 .028
Ob 0.03 0 .6 0.09 0.02 .08 0.06 0.01 .080
Sp 0.48 0.4 .7 0.33 0.64 .04 0.41 0.52 .17
Sn 0.4 0.28 .4 0.31 0.08 .02 0.35 0.18 .075
Classiﬁcation II
Partial info Full info Both
Cat. 1st 5th p-val 1st 5th p-val 1st 5th p-val
A 0.41 0.47 .6 0.4 0.31 .1 0.40 0.39 .75
B 0.35 0.39 .2 0.48 0.38 .4 0.42 0.38 .34
SQ 0.12 0.08 .1 0.02 0.1 .04 0.07 0.09 .17
C 0.03 0.02 .06 0.06 0.06 .8 0.04 0.04 .75
F 0.04 0.04 .9 0.03 0.09 .06 0.03 0.06 .17
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Table 11: Results of the OLS regressions with team payoﬀs and the allocative eﬃciency of
groups as dependent and the subcategories of reasoning as independent variables. Coeﬃ-
cients values are reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard signiﬁcance values
for asterisks: *** is 99%, ** is 95%, * is 90%.
Dependent Variable
Team payoﬀ All. eﬀ.
Const. 23.45*** 65.05
(4.99) (39.89)
Ol 17.98 -37.47
(13.42) (36.85)
Op -11.90 60.66
(12.43) (73.02)
Ob 124.30*** 157.25
(44.86) (129.97)
Sp 5.51 62.34
(12.94) 77.15
Sn 12.55 -58.11
(16.44) (39.58)
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Table 12: Results of the OLS regressions with team payoﬀs and the allocative eﬃciency
of groups as dependent and the categories of action as independent variables. Coeﬃcients
values are reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard signiﬁcance values for
asterisks: *** is 99%, ** is 95%, * is 90%.
Dependent Variable
Team payoﬀ All. eﬀ. Team payoﬀ All. eﬀ.
Const. 38.59*** 87.36* 33.64*** 100.42**
(12.13) (36.26) (11.13) (34.66)
A -9.84 10.74 3.03 -0.64
(13.78) (53.35) (13.33) (49.84)
B -17.50 -45.78 -1.79 -36.11
(14.33) (39.32) (14.18) (36.89)
C -60.70* 5.20 -45.86 -5.13
(33.61) (58.09) (30.91) (54.06)
F 57.76* 161.86* 54.72** 98.74
(29.13) (69.24) (26.41) (77.58)
R -64.46 342.62 -31.48 237.30
(133.20) (341.17) (121.25) (323.14)
Choice change -0.28** -0.10
(0.102) (0.071)
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Table 13: Results of the OLS regressions with the shares of O and S arguments in the
last part of the game as dependent variables. Independent variables are the shares of O
and S arguments in the ﬁrst part (O1 and S1), the shares of O and S arguments in the
other teams in the middle part (Oo2 and So2), a treatment dummy (TD) and the number
of rounds in which the teams has won in the middle part (Win2). Coeﬃcients values are
reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard signiﬁcance values for asterisks:
*** is 99%, ** is 95%, * is 90%.
Dependent Variable
O arguments S arguments
(last part) (last part)
Const. 1.29 -0.96
(0.79) (0.95)
O1 0.93*** -0.10
(0.33) (0.40)
S1 0.02 0.86
(0.46) (0.56)
Oo2 -1.56* 1.26
(0.87) (1.05)
So2 -1.10 0.96
(0.85) (1.03)
TD 0.15 -0.16
(0.15) (0.17)
Win2 -0.02* 0.02*
(0.009) (0.011)
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Table 14: Results of the OLS regressions with the shares of Ol, Op, Ob, Sp and Sn arguments
in the last part of the game as dependent variables. Independent variables are the shares of
arguments of the same type in the ﬁrst part (Ol1, Op1, Ob1, Sp1 and Sn1), the shares of O and
S arguments in the other teams in the middle part (Oo2 and So2), a treatment dummy (TD) and
the number of rounds in which the teams has won in the middle part (Win2). Coeﬃcients values
are reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard signiﬁcance values for asterisks: ***
is 99%, ** is 95%, * is 90%.
Dependent Variable
Ol arg. Op arg. Ob arg. Sp arg. Sn arg.
(last p.) (last p.) (last p.) (last p.) (last p.)
Const. 0.011 0.833 0.072 0.002 0.503
(0.620) (0.491) (0.051) (0.656) (0.583)
Ol1 0.102 - - - -
(0.129) - - - -
Op1 - -0.030 - - -
- (0.061) - - -
Ob1 - - 0.000 - -
- - (0.020) - -
Sp1 - - - -0.072 -
- - - (0.168) -
Sn1 - - - - 0.018
- - - - (0.088)
Oo2 0.045 -0.793 -0.097* -0.036 0.020
(0.699) (0.553) (0.057) (0.736) (0.658)
So2 0.333 -0.784 -0.079 -0.032 -0.393
(0.699) (0.553) (0.057) (0.734) (0.660)
TD 0.087 0.134 0.009 -0.049 -0.302***
(0.115) (0.088) (0.009) (0.118) (0.105)
Win2 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.019** -0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007)
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Table 15: Ols estimates of the frequencies of Classiﬁcation for subclasses of W, S, O, B
and I. The variables of the diﬀerent subclasses are estimated in separate equations for each
class. Dependent Variable: Payoﬀ. Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Standard signiﬁcance
values for asterisks: *** is 99%, ** is 95%, * is 90%.
Dep. Var. Payoﬀ - Subclasses
W S O B-I P
Ww 6.87 Sp 241.9*** Oi 10.38 Bs 162 Pp 1860
(7.64) (73.4) (478) (628) (1872)
Wr 79.48*** Sn -26.42 Or 655 Bc 170 Pt 1289**
(24.07) (93.1) (494) (562) (649)
Wc 109.1*** So 1251* Ol 124 Bo 728 *** Pl 782*
(25.14) (647) (87.0) (154) (425)
Wd -26.90 Sc 4878 Op 42 Is 2726** Po 1213
(92.02) (3252) (40.42) (1210) (881)
Wp -496.6 - - Ob 256 - -
(1186) (269)
We -3351 - - Ot 314 - -
(2597) (578)
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Table 16: Relative Frequency of the events payoﬀ tot=1,0 in the ﬁrst 20 rounds of the game.
Theoretical probabilities implied by mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium are also shown. Par-
tial Info and Full Info. Frequenza relativa delle istanze di payoﬀ tot=1,0 nei primi 20 rounds
di gioco, e distribuzione teorica.
Partial Info
First 20 rounds Last 20 rounds Theoretical
p(1) 0.71 0.90 0.75
p(2) 0.29 0.10 0.25
Full Info
First 20 rounds Last 20 rounds Theoretical
p(1) 0.70 0.93 0.75
p(2) 0.30 0.07 0.25
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Table 17: In this table we regress the share of Categories S in the last part of the experiment
(variable S3) versus S1, O1, S2, O2, O1ma, O1mb. Various models are tested, coeﬃcients
are reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard signiﬁcance levels apply: ***
for 0.99, ** for 0.95 and * for 0.90.
(Intercept) S1 S2 O1 O2 O1ma O1mb Adj.R2
Model 1 0.187** 1.01*** - - - - - 0.23
(0.09) (0.30) - - - - -
Model 2 0.13* 0.08 1.02*** - - - - 0.44
(0.08) (0.36) (0.27) - - - - -
Model 3 0.04 0.19 1** 0.12 - - - 0.43
(0.17) (0.4) (0.28) (0.19) - - - -
Model 4 0.04 0.29 0.9** 0.24 -0.14 - - 0.41
(0.17) (0.5) (0.4) (0.39) (0.140) - - -
Model 5 0.51*** - - - - -0.22 -0.03 0.01
(0.12) - - - - (0.17) (0.17)
Model 6 0.65*** - - - -0.44** - - 0.09
(0.13) - - (0.22) - -
47
Table 18: In this table we regress the share of Categories S in the last part of the experiment
(variable O3) versus O1, S1, S2, S1ma, S1mb. Various models are tested, coeﬃcients are
reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard signiﬁcance levels apply: *** for
0.99, ** for 0.95 and * for 0.90.
(Intercept) O1 O2 S1 S2 S1ma S1mb Adj.R2
Model 1 0.04 0.59*** - - - - - 0.22
(0.12) (0.18) - - - - - -
Model 2 -0.0032 0.06 0.68** - - - - 0.32
(0.11) (0.27) (0.28) - - - - -
Model 3 -0.018 0.07 0.68** 0.03 - - - 0.30
(0.17) (0.29) (0.28) (0.30) - - - -
Model 4 0.14 0.52** - - - 0.004 -0.27 0.19
(0.20) (0.21) - - - 0.30 0.31 -
Model 5 0.19 0.50*** - - -0.36* - - 0.26
(0.15) (0.18) - - (0.21) - - -
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Table 19: In this table we regress the share of Categories S in the last part of the experiment
versus dummy variables that indicate strategies implemented by team players. Various
models are tested, coeﬃcients are reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard
signiﬁcance levels apply: *** for 0.99, ** for 0.95 and * for 0.90.
(Intercept) S1 ﬁxed1 ﬁxed2 mixed1 mixed2 Adj.R2
Model 1 0.08647 1.036*** 0.19842 0.09063 - - 0.28
(0.10) (0.28) (0.14) (0.09) - -
Model 2 0.37552 1.036 *** - - -0.198 -0.09063 0.28
(0.12) (0.28) - - (0.14) (0.12)
Model 3 0.1214 1.0310*** 0.2453** - - - 0.29
(0.09) (0.28) (0.12) - - -
Model 4 0.09948 1.028*** - 0.168 - - 0.26
(0.10) (0.29) - (0.11) - -
Model 5 0.3667*** 1.031*** - - -0.245** 0.29
(0.12) (0.28) - - (0.12) -
Model 6 0.2671*** 1.028*** - - - -0.1677 0.26
(0.10) (0.30) - - - (0.11)
Model 7 0.1874** 1.0102*** - - - - 0.23
(0.08) (0.29) - - - -
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Table 20: In this table we regress the share of Categories O in the last part of the experiment
versus dummy variables that indicate strategies implemented by team players. Various
models are tested, coeﬃcients are reported with standard errors in parenthesis. Standard
signiﬁcance levels apply: *** for 0.99, ** for 0.95 and * for 0.90.
(Intercept) O1 ﬁxed1 ﬁxed2 mixed1 mixed2 Adj.R2
Model 1 0.1200 0.6429*** -0.1494 -0.1467 - - 0.28
(0.12) (0.17) (0.13) (0.12) - -
Model 2 -0.1761 0.6428 - - 0.1494 0.1467 0.28
(0.1469) (0.1469) - - (0.1294) (0.1144)
Model 3 0.09504 0.5938** * -0.2253* - - - 0.28
(0.11) (0.17) (0.11) - - -
Model 4 0.1012 *** 0.6623** - -0.2071** - - 0.29
(0.12) (0.17) - (0.10) - -
Model 5 -0.1303 0.5938*** - - 0.2253* - 0.28
(0.14) (0.17) - - (0.12) -
Model 6 -0.1058 0.6623 *** - - - 0.2071** 0.29
(0.13) (0.17) - - - (0.10)
Model 7 0.0396 0.5921*** - - - - 0.22
(0.12) (0.18) - - - -
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